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1. lntroducfion
In this paper. we address on privacy issues ofSkype cal ls. With
the rapid growth of broadband Internet access services, the popu-

larity of VolP calls has grown significantly. As a competitor with
traditional phone services provided over Public Switched Telephone
Networks ( PSTN ). VolP services are known for their lower cost and

rIcher Features. Skype Is one of tile most popular VolP service
providers.

Skype VolP services are provided on a peer-ta-peer structure.
Skype peers form a n overlay network. A Skype call may be routed
through Skype peers during the call for better Qual ity of Service
(QoS) [1.2J. One of the main reasons for the popularity of Skype
VolP services is its unique set of feature s to protect privacy ofVolP
calls such as strong encryption [3J. proprietary protocols [3). unknown codecs [4). and dynamic path selection I (1.2). and the constant packet rate [5). To further protect privacy of Skype VolP calls.
advanced users are using anonymity networks to anonymize VolP
calls. For this purpose. low-latency anonymity networks such as
Tor [6) and JAP [7) can be used.
In this paper. we propose a class of passive traffic analysis
attacks to compromise privacy of Skype calls. The procedure of
the proposed attacks is as follows: First an adversary collects Skype
call traces made by a victim. say Alice. The adversary then extracts
application-level features of Alice's VolP calls and trains a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM ) with the extracted features. To test whether

a call of interest is made by Alice. the adversary can extract features from the trace of the call and calculate likelihood of the call
being made by Alice. The proposed attacks can identify speeches
or speakers of Skype calls with high probabilities.
The contributions made in this paper are summarized as
follows:
• .we propose a class of trartlc analysis attac ks to compromi se privacy of Skype calls. The attacks are passive and based on the
HMM. a powerful tool to model temporal data. We also propose
a method to extract application-level features from traffic flows
for application-level traffic analysis attac ks.
• .we evaluate the proposed traffic analysis attacks through
extensive experiments over the Internet and commercial
anonymity networks. For most of Skype calls made in the
experiments. the two parties are at least 20 hops away and
the end-to-end delay between two parties is at least 80 ms.
Our experiments show that the traffic analysis attacks are able
to detect speeches or speakers of Skype calls with high
probabilities.
• .we propose intersection attac ks to im prove the effectiveness of
the proposed attacks.
• .we propose a countermeasure to mitigate the proposed traffic
analysis attacks and analyze the effect of the countermeasure
on quality of Skype ca ll s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : Section 2 reviews
related work. In Section 3. we formally define the problem. The deta ils of proposed tra ffic analysis a ttac ks a re described in Section 4.
In Section 5. we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed traffic
analysis attacks with expe riments on commercialized anonymity

networks and our campus network. Section 7 presents a counter
measure to mitigate the proposed trafﬁc analysis attacks. Discus
sion and the outline of future work are given in Section 8. We
conclude the paper in Section 9.

2. Related work
In this section, we review related work on low-latency anonym
ity networks and related trafﬁc analysis attacks.
2.1. Low-latency anonymity networks
After Chaum proposed the anonymous communication for
email in his seminal paper [8], many low-latency anonymity net
works have been proposed or even implemented for different
applications. The examples are ISDN-mixes [9] for telephony, Web
Mix [7] for web browsing, MorphMix [10] for peer-to-peer applica
tions, GAP base GNUnet [11] for ﬁle sharing. TARZAN [12], Onion
Router [13], and Tor [6], the second-generation onion router, are
designed for general usage by low-latency applications. Especially
Tor has some desirable features for low-latency applications such
as perfect forward secrecy and congestion control. In our experi
ments, we used the anonymity network managed by ﬁndnot.com
to anonymize VoIP calls instead of the Tor network, because UDP
trafﬁc is not natively supported by Tor. The commercialized anon
ymous communication services provided by ﬁndnot.com can allow
us to route VoIP packets through entry points located in different
countries into the anonymity network.
Common techniques used in low-latency anonymity networks
are encryption and re-routing. Encryption prevents packet content
access by adversaries. To confuse adversaries, anonymity networks
using re-routing techniques forward encrypted packets in a usually
longer and random path instead of using the shortest path between
the sender and the receiver. To attack an anonymity network using
the re-routing technique, the attacker usually needs to be more
powerful, for example, to be a global attacker.
2.2. Trafﬁc analysis attacks
Trafﬁc analysis attacks can be classiﬁed into two categories,
network-level trafﬁc analysis attacks and application-level trafﬁc
analysis attacks.
Network-level trafﬁc analysis attacks target at disclosing net
work-level or transport-level information. Most privacy-related
network-level trafﬁc analysis attacks focus on trafﬁc ﬂow identiﬁ
cation or trafﬁc ﬂow tracking. The examples are attacks by Levine
et al. [14] on anonymity networks, the active attack proposed by
Murdoch and Danezis [15] on the Tor network, our ﬂow correlation
[16], and our ﬂow separation [17] attacks.
Application-level trafﬁc analysis attacks target at disclosing
application-level information. The examples are keystroke detec
tion based on packet timing [18], web page identiﬁcation [19],
spoken phrase identiﬁcation [20] with variable bit rate codecs.
The trafﬁc analysis attacks proposed in this paper are at
application-level. These attacks can detect speeches or speakers
of Skype calls based on talk patterns, the application-level features
which do not vary from call to call.
There are a number of research efforts focusing on trafﬁc
analysis of VoIP. Wang et al. [24] proposed to watermark VoIP traf
ﬁc ﬂows to trace VoIP calls through the Internet. In [21], Wright
et al. showed that it was possible to recover spoken phrases from
VoIP packet size information. Wright et al. [22] also showed the
feasibility to detect languages used in VoIP conversations based
on VoIP packet size information.

Similar as [21,22], our research in this paper focuses on disclos
ing application-level information from trafﬁc analysis of VoIP. The
trafﬁc analysis attacks proposed in this paper aim to identify
speakers of VoIP calls. Another difference is on the type of VoIP
codecs and protocols. The researches in [21,22] focus on a variable
bit rate (VBR) codec, more speciﬁcally the open-source Speex codec
[23], and standardized VoIP protocols. We focus on the Skype VoIP
service which uses codecs unknown to the public and its own pro
prietary protocols. Skype is also known for its strong encryption
preventing packet content access. These privacy protection mea
sures taken by Skype render trafﬁc analysis on Skype VoIP trafﬁc
more difﬁcult since (1) we have to treat the Skype software as a
black box and (2) we are not even able to identify signaling packets
so that these signaling packets can be completely removed before
trafﬁc analysis.2
3. Problem deﬁnition
In this paper, we focus on trafﬁc analysis on Skype VoIP calls
through anonymity networks to disclose sensitive information at
application-level. More speciﬁcally, we are interested in detecting
speeches and speakers of Skype VoIP calls by analyzing trafﬁc pat
terns at the application-level.
A typical attack scenario focused in this paper is as follows: An
adversary who has possession of traces of previous Skype VoIP calls
made by a victim, say Alice, may want to detect whether Alice is
talking to Bob now by collecting Skype packets on the link to
Bob. The adversary may also want to detect the speech content,
such as the repetition of a partial speech in previous Skype calls.
In this paper, we assume that trafﬁc traces used in analysis can
be collected at different time. This is the major difference between
our research and the previous researches. Most of the previous re
searches assume that the adversary has simultaneous access to both
links connected to Alice and Bob during the Skype call between Alice
and Bob. By passively correlating VoIP ﬂows at both ends or ac
tively watermarking VoIP ﬂows, the adversary can detect whether
Alice is communicating with Bob. But for the typical attack sce
nario described above, both ﬂow correlation and watermarking
techniques do not work because traces to be compared are col
lected from different VoIP calls: (a) Correlation between different
calls is low. (b) Watermarks used to mark trafﬁc ﬂows of Alice’s
VoIP calls can be different for different calls because of recycling
watermarks or simply because Alice is making a call from a differ
ent location or with a different computer.
3.1. Network model
In the paper, we assume Alice makes VoIP calls by Skype. We
are particularly interested in Skype VoIP calls because: (a) Skype
is based on peer-to-peer structure. During a Skype call, VoIP pack
ets may follow more than one path through different Skype peers
or Skype supernodes [1]. The peer-to-peer structure and dynamic
path selection make security attacks or eavesdropping on Skype
calls more difﬁcult. (b) Skype uses proprietary protocols so that
attackers cannot differentiate media packets from signaling pack
ets. (c) Skype uses unknown codecs that renders trafﬁc analysis
exploiting characteristics of voice codecs nearly impossible [4].
(d) Skype calls are encrypted and hard to decipher [3]. (e) Skype
sends packets at the constant rate of 33 packet/s [5]. Due to the un
ique set of features listed above, Skype is known as secure voice
2
In general, signaling packets are not affected by talk patterns so signaling packets
are essentially ‘‘noise’’ in recovering talk patterns from Skype trafﬁc. Signaling packets
are not considered in [21,22] since these packets can be ﬁltered out easily for
standardized VoIP calls. In other words, patterns recovered from VoIP trafﬁc in [21,22]
are noise-free.

communication [3] which can protect privacy of communication
parties.
As shown in Fig. 1, we assume Alice routes Skype calls through
anonymity networks to further protect privacy of her Skype calls.
For better voice quality, Alice can use low-latency anonymity net
works such as Tor and JAP.

One of the challenges in this paper is to extract application-level
features from collected VoIP packet traces, i.e., features existing in
different VoIP calls. Based on the features existing in different VoIP
calls, trafﬁc analysis attacks can possibly detect speeches or speak
ers of VoIP calls. The feature used in the proposed attacks is the
throughput vector [s1, s2, . . . , sn], where n is the length of the vector.
The element si in the throughput vector is calculated as follows:

3.2. Threat model

si ¼
We focus on passive attacks in this paper. In other words, the
attacks launched by the adversary do not disturb the existing net
work trafﬁc. In comparison with active trafﬁc analysis attacks
[15,24], the proposed attacks are harder to detect.
We assume that the adversary only has access to the links
directly connected to participants of VoIP calls. This assumption
is widely used in trafﬁc analysis attacks such as attacks on ano
nymity networks [15]. We do not assume the adversary as a global
attacker because re-routing techniques used in anonymity
networks and dynamic path selection employed by Skype make
global attacks too costly to be practical.
Our threat model does not require simultaneous access to the
links connected to participants of a VoIP call since it may not be
feasible for long-distance calls, such as international calls. Instead
we assume the adversary can collect traces of VoIP calls made by
Alice in advance and use these collected traces to detect whether
Alice is a participant in the VoIP conversation of interest. Our mod
el is similar as the model for identifying a human being by ﬁnger
prints: Fingerprints of human beings are collected in advance
through driver license applications. To identify a speciﬁc person,
the ﬁngerprint of interest such as a ﬁngerprint in a crime scene will
be compared against the person’s ﬁngerprints collected in advance.
The threat model assumes the detections are based on different
Skype calls. So the speaker identiﬁcation should also be indepen
dent of the voice content of Skype calls.
4. Detecting speech and speaker of skype-based VoIP calls
In this section, we describe trafﬁc analysis attacks to detect
speeches or speakers of encrypted VoIP calls. We begin the section
with an overview of the proposed trafﬁc analysis attack and details
of each step in our algorithm are described after the overview.
4.1. Overview
The proposed trafﬁc analysis attacks are based on packet size
information. A simple experiment shown in Fig. 2 indicates that
packet size information can disclose speech-level information.
Fig. 2(a) shows an audio signal with three silence periods.
Fig. 2(b) shows the packet sequence generated by feeding the
audio signal into Skype clients. From the packet sequence plotted
in Fig. 2(b), we can observe: (a) Even during silent periods, Skype
clients still generate packets at a constant rate. (b) During silent
periods, VoIP packets generated by Skype are small in comparison
with packets generated during talk periods. We do not focus on
packet timing information in this paper mainly because Skype cli
ents send VoIP packets at a constant rate [5].

sum of bytes received or sent during the ith sample interval
T
ð1Þ

where T is the length of sample intervals.
The length of sample interval T should be selected in the order
of seconds for the following two reasons: (a) Because of re-routing
techniques used in anonymity networks and dynamic path selec
tion employed in Skype, VoIP packets can arrive at destination in
an order different from the order at sending end. A larger sample
interval can largely absorb the difference. This is also the reason
why we do not use per-packet size as the feature vector. (b) Talk
patterns are of low frequency while network dynamics is of higher
frequency. Network dynamics is usually in the order of millisecond
while the patterns such as silent periods are in the order of seconds
[25]. The averaging effect of sample intervals is equivalent as lowpass ﬁltering. A larger sample interval in the order of seconds can
ﬁlter out network dynamics information which can vary from call
to call and keep the low-frequency talk patterns.
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based classiﬁer is used to de
tect speeches or speakers of VoIP calls. The HMM is a well-known
tool to model temporal data and it has been successfully used in
temporal pattern recognition such as speech recognition [26],
handwriting recognition [27], and gesture recognition [28]. In the
proposed attacks, HMMs are trained to model talk patterns.
The proposed attacks can be divided into two phases: The train
ing phase and the detection phase as shown in Fig. 3. The two steps
in the training phase are feature extraction and HMM training. The
detection phase consists of three steps: Feature extraction, speech
detection or speaker detection, and intersection attack. The last
step, intersection attack, is optional. We describe the details of
each step below.
4.2. Feature extraction
The input and output of the feature extraction step are raw
traces of Skype calls and throughput vectors, respectively.
Two parameters are used in this step to control the generation
of throughput vectors: (a) Length of sample interval T: As
described in Section 4.1, the length of sample interval should be
large enough to ﬁlter out network dynamics different from call
to call and keep talk patterns. At the same time, it is desired to se
lect a sample interval small enough so that throughput vectors are
long enough for the training purpose. (b) Threshold on packet size
Hpacket: The threshold is used to ﬁlter out signaling packets and
excluding signaling packets can lead to better trained HMMs of talk
patterns. Since Skype uses proprietary protocols, unknown codecs,
and encryption, it is impossible to separate signaling packets based
on protocol headers. We heuristically differentiate signaling pack
ets from media packets by the threshold Hpacket: Signaling packets
are usually smaller than media packets. In raw VoIP traces, we also
ﬁnd that packets of small and ﬁxed sizes are sent or received peri
odically and independent of speech activities. The guidelines on
the choice of these two parameters are given in Section 5.
4.3. HMM training

Fig. 1. Network model.

The input and output of this step are throughput vectors and
trained HMMs respectively.
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Fig. 3. Steps of the proposed attacks.

The Markov Model is a tool to model a stochastic process with
the Markov property that the transition from the current state to
the next state depends only on the current state, i.e., independent
from the past states. In a Hidden Markov Model, the state is not di
rectly visible, but outputs inﬂuenced by the state are observed.
Each state has a probability distribution over the possible outputs.
Therefore the sequence of outputs generated by an HMM gives
some information about the sequence of states. A nice introduction
of Hidden Markov Model can be found in [29].
In the proposed attacks, HMMs are trained to model talk pat
terns used for speech detection or speaker detection. More specif
ically, the attacks are based on on–off patterns of silence in
speeches which have been used as one feature for speaker detec
tion [30]. As shown in Fig. 2, the on–off patterns in speeches can
be possibly recovered from packet size. But the pattern recovery
is noisy because: (a) It is impossible to differentiate voice packets
from signaling packets. (b) A sample interval may contain several
on–off periods or may be a part of a long silent gap or talk spurt.
Ideally only two states, talk and silence, are enough to model talk
patterns with a voice silence detector as used in [30]. Because of
the noise in pattern recovery, more states of different combina
tions of on–off periods are used in the HMM. We heuristically set
the number of states in the HMM to be eight according to the
length of throughput vectors. The HMM used in trafﬁc analysis
attacks is the left–right HMM [29] as shown in Fig. 4. The left–right
model, also called as a Bakis model [31,32], has the property that
the stat index is non-decreasing with the time. In other words,

ai;j ¼ 0;

when j < i

ð2Þ

where ai,j denotes the state transition probability from the ith state
to the jth state and the zero transition probability means that the
transition from the ith state to the jth state is prohibited if j < i as
shown in Fig. 4. The left–right model also requires that

pi ¼

1; i ¼ 1
0; i – 1

ð3Þ

where pi denotes the initial state probability for the ith state. In
other words, the left–right model mandates that the state sequence
starts from the ﬁrst state. We choose the left–right model because
of the nonergodic nature of speech signals [29], i.e., the attribute
of signals whose properties change over time. Each node in Fig. 4
represents a state in one sample interval. The observable variable
is the throughput of each sample interval.
Two kinds of HMMs can be trained: (a) For the speech detection,
we focus on detecting speeches made by one speciﬁc speaker, say
Alice. So a speech-speciﬁc model can be obtained by training the
model with traces of the same speeches made by Alice. (b) A
speaker-speciﬁc model can be obtained by training the HMM with

Fig. 4. A left–right Hidden Markov Model.

Fig. 5. Experiment setup.

traces of VoIP calls made by a speciﬁc speaker. The trained HMMs
are used in the following speech detection or speaker detection.
4.4. Speech detection and speaker detection
The inputs to this step are the Alice’s speech-speciﬁc or Alice’s
speaker-speciﬁc HMM trained in the previous step and throughput
vectors generated from a candidate pool of raw VoIP traces of
interest. The output of this step is the intermediate detection re
sult. For the speaker detection, the intermediate detection result
is Ktop speakers from the candidate pool with talk patterns closest
to Alice’s talk pattern. For the speech detection, the intermediate
detection result is Ktop speeches from the candidate pool with
speech patterns closest to talk patterns in training traces.
The detection step can be divided into two phases: (a) First, the
likelihood of each throughput vector is calculated with the trained
HMM. (b) The trace with the highest likelihood is declared as the
trace generated from a speciﬁc speech by Alice if intersection at
tack is not used. To improve detection accuracy, the intermediate
detection results can be fed into the optional step, intersection
attack.
4.5. Intersection attack
The intersection step is designed to improve detection accuracy.
The input to this step is the intermediate detection result from the
previous step. The output is a ﬁnal detection result.
The main idea of the intersection attack is similar as described
in [33–35]: Instead of deciding the detection result based on one
trial, we can improve detection accuracy by a number of trials
and the ﬁnal detection result is determined by combining (or inter
secting) the results from each trial.
More speciﬁcally, for the proposed attacks, suppose it is possi
ble to get m Skype call traces made by the same speaker, the adver
sary can do m trials as described in Section 4.4. From each
detection, the adversary can obtain k traces with the Ktop highest
likelihoods. The overall rank for each speaker is calculated by add
ing ranks in m trials. The speaker with the highest rank is deter
mined to be Alice. Tie can be broken by comparing the sum of
likelihood in m trials.
5. Empirical evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
detection.
5.1. Experiment setup
The experiment setup is as shown in Fig. 5. Skype packets are
ﬁrst directed to the anonymity network managed by ﬁndnot.com
and then relayed by Skype peers or supernodes before arriving at
the other end of the call. We use the commercial anonymous com
munication services provided by ﬁndnot.com mainly because it is
possible to select entry points into the anonymity network [36].

In our experiments, Skype packets were directed through entry
points in England, Germany, and United States as shown in
Fig. 5. For these Skype calls made through anonymity networks,
the end-to-end delay is at least 80 ms and the two communication
parties are at least 20 hops away from each other. About a quarter
of calls are made through campus network so that traces of VoIP
calls over a wide range of networks are available for our
experiments.
The audio signals are extracted from videos hosted on Research
Channels [37] for consistent sound quality. The length of extracted
audio signals about 38 min. At least three different speeches are
available for most speakers and each speech was sent through at
least four different network entry points.3 In total 180 Skype calls
were made through different entry points of the anonymity net
work managed by ﬁndnot.com and through the campus network.
5.2. Metrics
We use detection rate to measure effectiveness of the proposed
attacks. In this paper, detection rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the
number of successful detections to the number of attempts.
For both speech detection and speaker detection, the detection
1
, because in each trial, there are
rate for random guess is about 169
169 candidate traces in the pool on average. One of the traces in
the pool is the correct trace, i.e., the trace generated by a speciﬁc
speech. In each trial of speech detection, three traces of the same
speech are used for training and one trace of the same speech is
one of the candidate traces. In each trial of speaker detection,
one trace of Alice’s speech is used as one of the candidate traces
and Alice’s other traces are used for training.
In all the experiments below, the training traces and candidate
traces are all collected from different Skype calls. For better train
ing, all the traces used in training are collected from sending end,
i.e., from the link connected to Alice’s computer.
5.3. Effect of parameter T (length of sample interval)
This series of experiments are designed to test the effect of the
parameter T, length of sample interval.
Fig. 6 shows the effect of the parameter T on speech detection.
From these two ﬁgures, we can observe: (a) For a wide range of T,
the detection rate is larger than 0.1, about 10-fold improvement
over random guess. (b) When T is small, the detection rate is
relatively low. It is because a small T cannot be used to extract talk
pattern usually in the order of second as discussed in Section 4.1.
(c) When T becomes large, the detection rate may drop simply
because of shorter throughput vector used for training and
detection. (d) The detection rate can be as high as 0.3, about
50-fold improvement over random guess. (e) The detection rate
for candidate traces collected from sending end is comparable with
the detection rate for candidate traces collected from receiving
end. It is because T is big enough to ﬁlter out network dynamics
3

The campus network entry point is one of the choices.
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Fig. 6. Effect of parameter T on speech detection.

at receiving end which can vary from call to call. Similar observa
tions can be made from Fig. 7. The detection rate for speaker detec
tion can reach 0.18, about 30-fold improvement over random
guess.
5.4. Effect of parameter Hpacket (threshold on packet size)
These series of experiments are designed to test the effect of the
parameter Hpacket, threshold on packet size.
Fig. 8 shows the effect of the parameter Hpacket on speech detec
tion. From Fig. 8, we can observe: (a) When Hpacket is less than 100
bytes, the detection rate is low. We believe it is because small
Hpacket cannot be used to remove all signaling packets. (b) When
Hpacket is larger than 130 bytes, the detection rate may decrease.
The reason is too few packets are left because of the larger thresh
old. (c) The detection rate for speech detection can achieve 0.32,
about 55-fold improvement over random guess.
Fig. 9 shows the effect of the parameter Hpacket on speaker detec
tion. We can observe: (a) The best range of Hpacket for speaker
detection is from 110 bytes to 130 bytes. (b) The detection rate
can reach to 0.2, about 34-fold improvement over random guess.
5.5. Length of training traces and test traces
The length of training traces and test traces available for trafﬁc
analysis largely determines the effectiveness of proposed trafﬁc

0.2

analysis. In this set of experiments, we evaluate performance of
the proposed attacks with different lengths of training traces and
test traces. Fig. 10 shows the experiment results on length of test
traces. The results are obtained with training traces of length
38.5 min, T = 110 s, and Hpacket = 120 bytes. We can observe that
detection rates for both speaker detection and speech detection in
crease with length of test traces. When test traces are 25 min long,
the detection rates for speaker detection and speech detection are
0.30 and 0.23, 50-fold and 39-fold improvement over random
guess respectively. In this set of experiments, we also observe that
speakers with similar talk patterns such as multiple similar seg
ments of throughput vectors are misidentiﬁed as each other with
higher probabilities than other speakers. When the length of train
ing and test traces increases, the probability distribution of the
misidentiﬁcation is more close to the uniform distribution. We
believe it is because (1) talk patterns from different speaker are
different albeit of some similarities and (2) longer traces can better
train the models to capture the difference.

5.6. Pool size
In this set of experiments, we investigate the performance of
trafﬁc analysis attacks with different size of candidate pool. From
the experiments results shown in Fig. 11, we can observe that
when pool size increases, the detection rate slightly decreases for
both speech detection and speaker detection, since it is harder to
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Fig. 10. Detection performance with different length of training traces and test traces.

ﬁnd the right one from a larger candidate pool. But the ratio between the speech detection rate and random guess rate changes
from 12.59 when pool size is 27–31.60 when pool size is 105,
meaning the trafﬁc analysis attacks are more effective when the
pool size is large.

5.7. Intersection attack
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of
intersection attacks on speaker detection. On average, there are
33 candidate speakers. So the detection rate for random guess is

0.7

follows: We assume that the adversary possesses traces of speech
communications made by Alice and other speakers. We call these
traces as labeled traces since these traces are collected in advance
and the adversary knows the identities of speakers. The goal of the
adversary is to detect, whether Alice is the speaker of a speech
communication of interest. The major differences from the initial
threat model are: (1) The initial threat model assumes that the
adversary only possesses the Alice’s traces in advance. In the new
threat model, the adversary possesses both Alice’s traces and other
speakers’ traces in advance. (2) In the initial threat model, the
adversary aims to ﬁnd Alice’s trace from a pool of candidate traces
based on Alice’s traces collected in advance. The goal of the adver
sary in the new threat model is to detect whether a speech com
munication of interest is made by Alice.
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Fig. 11. Detection performance with different pool size.

1
about 33
. Each candidate speaker has 3 Skype traces available for
detection so the ﬁnal detection result is obtained by combining
the intermediate detection results of 3 trials.
From previous experiments, we learned suitable ranges for
parameters T and Hpacket to achieve higher detection rate. We use
parameters in these ranges in the intersection attacks described
below.
Fig. 12 shows the performance of intersection attack. From
Fig. 12, we can observe: (a) When Ktop, the number of most likely
candidates selected from each trial, increases, in general the detec
tion rate increases because more high-likelihood traces are consid
ered in the intersection attack step. (b) The detection rate can
reach 0.44, about 15-fold improvement over random guess. (c)
The detection rate for candidate traces collected from sending
end is again comparable with the detection rate for candidate
traces collected from receiving end.
In summary, the proposed trafﬁc analysis attacks can signiﬁ
cantly improve the detection rate over random guess. We believe
that given more training traces, higher detection rate can be
achieved. Through cross-validation and averaging detection perfor
mance over various parameters, we believe the detection results
are generally applicable.

6. False alarm evaluation of speaker detection
In this section, we evaluate the proposed speaker detection with
false alarm rates. For this purpose, we changed the threat model as

We modify the detection approach for the new trafﬁc analysis
attack as follows:
1. The adversary splits the labeled traces of Alice’s speech commu
nications into two halves. An HMM to model Alice’s talk pattern
is established based on the ﬁrst half of the traces.
2. A detection threshold Ttol is determined based on remaining
labeled traces including the second half of traces of Alice’s
speech communications. The adversary evaluates each of these
traces against Alice’s model and calculates its likelihood. Given
a threshold Ttol, the false positive rate and the false negative rate
on the remaining labeled traces can be calculated as follows: (a)
False negative rate is deﬁned as the proportion of Alice’s speech
communications detected as speech communications made by
other speakers, i.e., the proportion of Alice’s speech communi
cations with likelihood values less than Ttol. (b) False positive
rate is deﬁned as the proportion of speech communications
made by other speakers detected as Alice’s speech communica
tions, i.e., the proportion of other speakers’ traces with likeli
hood values larger than Ttol. The threshold Ttol is selected so
that the detection rates on the remaining traces are maximized
and both the false negative rate and the false positive rate on
the remaining labeled traces are below a tolerance threshold
Ttol.
3. The adversary makes a detection decision by evaluating a given
trace with Alice’s HMM. If the calculated likelihood is larger
than Ttol, the given trace is declared as Alice’s trace. Otherwise,
the trace is declared as a trace made by other speakers.
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6.2. Performance evaluation

7.1. Skype camouﬂage

We evaluate the detection performance with three metrics: False
negative rate, false positive rate, and percentage of traces which can
be tested. The two metrics, the false negative rate and the false posi
tive rate used in performance evaluation, are calculated on the test
traces. The last metric, percentage of traces which can be tested, is
needed because for certain group of labeled traces, it is impossible
to ﬁnd a threshold Ttol so that both false negative rate and false posi
tive rate on the labeled traces are below a given tolerance Ttol. In this
set of experiments, the parameters are T = 110 s and Hpacket = 120 
bytes and the average length of labeled traces and test traces are
39 min. The experiment results are averaged over all possible com
binations of training traces and test traces.
Experiment results shown in Fig. 13 indicate that false positive
rate and false negative rate both increase when the tolerance Ttol
increases as expected and in the mean time, the percentage of trace
which can be tested increases. A smaller tolerance Ttol means better
training, and in turn, better detection performance. A smaller toler
ance Ttol also means stricter requirements so fewer traces can be
tested. We can also observe that both false positive rate and false
negative rate are below 0.2 when Ttol = 0.15 and around 60% traces
can be tested.
From Fig. 13, we can observe that both false alarm rate and false
negative rate are larger than 0.1 when Ttotal P 0.1. In other words,
the proposed detection approach is not very effective in practice
when Ttotal P 0.1. But still the detection results indicate the a seri
ous vulnerability: The detection rates much higher than the ran
dom guess rate indicate that the detection approach can greatly
reduce the anonymity of the Skype speech communications.

The main idea of the countermeasure is to camouﬂage Alice’s
Skype packets according to another speaker’s traces. As shown in
Fig. 14, Alice’s Skype packets are re-packetized according to packet
sizes of another speaker’s Skype packets. The re-packetization is
controlled by the byte tokens generated according to packet size
of Speaker X’s Skype packets: (1) When it is time to send Speaker
X’s Skype packet of size v-byte, a v-byte token is generated to sig
nal the re-packetization module to allow v-byte Skype payload
stored in buffer to be transmitted. (2) If the buffer is empty, dum
my packets will be sent to consume available byte tokens. During
re-packetization, packet delimiters are added to the end of original
packets and these re-packetized packets are encrypted with a ses
sion key shared between both parties of the Skype call.4
At the receiving end, the re-packetized packets are ﬁrst de
crypted with the session key and then converted to original Skype
packets based on the packet delimiters. Recovered Skype packets
are forwarded to the Skype client.

7. Possible countermeasures
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the proposed traf
ﬁc analysis attacks can greatly compromise the privacy of Skype
calls. Countermeasures are needed to protect privacy of Skype
calls.
A naive countermeasure is to pad all the packets to the same
size. We do not propose this countermeasure because: (a) A signif
icant amount of bandwidth can be wasted to send padding bits. (b)
Skype ﬂows of constant packet sizes may catch special interest
from adversaries.
In the rest of this section, we introduce a countermeasure which
can protect privacy at the cost of marginal effect on quality of VoIP
calls.

7.2. Performance evaluation of the countermeasure
We evaluate the countermeasure with two metrics: (a) The
detection rate deﬁned in Section 5-B: It is used to measure the per
formance of preserving privacy of Skype calls. (b) Packet delay
caused by the countermeasure: We use it to measure the degrada
tion of quality of VoIP calls.
In this set of experiments, we use real traces collected from the
experiment environment described in Section 5.1.
Fig. 15 shows the performance of the countermeasure. Fig. 15(a)
shows that the countermeasure can preserve the privacy of Skype
calls since the detection rate is around the probability of random
guess. Fig. 15(b) shows the distribution of packet delay caused
by the countermeasure. The mean of the delay caused by the coun
termeasure is 0.10 ms. The delay is less than 0.102 ms with a prob
ability larger than 0.95. So the delay caused by the countermeasure
is negligible. In other words, the countermeasure will not cause
any signiﬁcant change in the quality of Skype calls since it is much
less than the delay budget for VoIP calls [39].
In our experiments, we also ﬁnd the delay caused by the
countermeasure is smaller when Speaker X speaks more than Alice
since more byte tokens are generated. So it is desired to
4
The session key can be shared between both parties with Difﬁe–Hellman
exchange as in Zphone [38].

Fig. 14. Countermeasure: camouﬂaging Alice’s Skype packets.
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Fig. 15. Performance of the proposed countermeasure.

camouﬂage Alice’s Skype calls with a Skype trace from a speaker
who speaks more than Alice in phone calls. Our future work will
focus on modeling the delay caused by the difference between
Alice’s speech and Speaker X’s speech and providing a guideline
on choosing Skype traces of Speaker X.
8. Discussion and future work
Our experiments clearly show that the proposed trafﬁc analysis
attacks can greatly compromise privacy of Skype calls. The detec
tion rates for speech detection and speaker detection are 35-fold
and 15-fold improvement over random guess. Aside from the inter
section attack, a number of improvements could be made to for
higher detection rates: (1) Adding more training traces or increas
ing the length of training traces will improve detection perfor
mance as shown in Fig. 10. Given the satisfactory results with
only a small number of training traces, we leave the task of further
improving performance of the trafﬁc analysis attacks for future
work. (2) We can also improve the detection performance by
removing the noise in the talk pattern recovery. Since Skype uses
proprietary protocols and strong encryption, it is not easy to differ
entiate speech packets from signaling packets. In turn, the recov
ered talk patterns are noisy. We plan to further analyze the
Skype trafﬁc and investigate approaches to separate out signaling
packets to further improve detection performance.
The traditional speaker detection problem assuming access to
speech signals has been well studied [40]. In [30], a speaker detec
tion approach based on face, mouth motion, and silence detection
is proposed. In comparison with the 90% high detection rate
achieved in [30], our detection rate is relatively low simply because
fewer features are available for trafﬁc analysis and only noisy
talk patterns recovered from packet sizes are available for trafﬁc

analysis. We plan to investigate the fundamental limits of the
proposed attacks with only noisy talk patterns recovered from
Skype traces in our future work.
The framework proposed in this paper, including extracting
application-level features from network trafﬁc traces and statisti
cal analysis of extracted application-level feature by the HMM,
can be potentially used for other applications. For example, it can
be used to detect cheating with game bots in on line gaming since
game bots and human players play games in different ways so that
their gaming patterns at the application layer are different. One of
our future tasks is to explore the potential of the framework.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a class of passive trafﬁc analysis
attacks to compromise privacy of Skype VoIP calls. The proposed
attacks are based on application-level features extracted from VoIP
call traces. The proposed attacks are evaluated by extensive exper
iments over different types of networks including commercialized
anonymity networks and our campus network. The experiments
show that the proposed trafﬁc analysis attacks can greatly compro
mise the privacy of Skype calls with only a small number of train
ing traces. We propose a countermeasure to mitigate the proposed
trafﬁc analysis attacks by camouﬂaging. The proposed counter
measure has negligible effect on quality of Skype calls.
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